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LOSING FAITH: AMERICA WITHOUT 
JUDICIAL REVIEW? 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS. By Mark 
Tushnet. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 242. 
$29.95. 
In the last decade, it has become increasingly trendy to question 
whether the Supreme Court and constitutional judicial review really 
can make a difference. Gerald Rosenberg, for example, in The 
Hollow Hope, expressly questions whether judicial review achieves 
effective social change.1 Similarly, Michael Klarman explores whether 
the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions were effective, except 
insofar as they produced a right-wing backlash that induced action to 
desegregate.2 
In Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, Mark Tushnet3 
approvingly invokes these arguments (pp. 137, 145), but he goes much 
further. Professor Tushnet contends that, on balance, constitutional 
judicial review is harmful. He maintains that it produces relatively few 
benefits that could not be gained through the political process and that 
it actually has serious costs. He contends that without judicial review, 
a populist constitutional movement, with a vibrant public rhetoric of 
constitutionalism, would emerge (p. 154). Without constitutional judi­
cial review, he posits, there will be more development of statutory 
rights and perhaps even a growth in welfare rights (p. 165). 
Professor Tushnet thus argues, as his title suggests, that the 
Constitution should be taken away from the courts. Although he 
never precisely defin�s what this means, it is clear that he is calling for 
the end of constitutional judicial review. For example, at one point he 
suggests that the Supreme Court do this via a decision proclaiming 
that Marbury v. Madison4 was a failed experiment and that judicial 
* Sydney M. Innas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science, 
University of Southern California. B.S. 1975, Northwestern; J.D. 1978, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? {1991). 
2. Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. 
REV. 7 {1994). 
3. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center. 
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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review end in 2003 (p. 154). Toward the end of the book, he describes 
Robert Bork's proposal to amend the Constitution by including a 
provision that permits Congress to overrule a Supreme Court decision 
by majority vote.5 Springing from Bork's proposal, Tushnet argues 
that it would be preferable to go further and end judicial review 
altogether. 
Tushnet's book is the logical culmination of two trends in liberal 
scholarship: the view that judicial review makes little positive differ­
ence and the strong disagreement with many decisions of the last quar­
ter-century by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Tushnet invokes 
numerous examples of what he regards as undesirable rulings, includ­
ing such outcomes of Supreme Court decisions invalidating affirmative 
action programs (pp. 139-40), advancing protection of states' rights 
and federalism (pp. 99-101), and limiting campaign finance reform and 
protecting corporate speech (p. 180).6 If the Court does little good 
with its judicial review, but imposes significant harms, the conclusion 
becomes to eliminate judicial review. Ironically, the political left, as 
embodied in Tushnet, and the political right, as reflected in Bork, 
come together in an effort to end constitutional judicial review. 
Although I have the greatest respect for Professor Tushnet and his 
enormous contributions to constitutional scholarship,7 I strongly dis­
agree with virtually every aspect of this book. In short, I believe that 
Tushnet underestimates the benefits of judicial review by selectively 
choosing examples where the political process might work in protect­
ing rights and overestimates the gains from eliminating judicial review 
by hypothesizing an idealized populist constitutionalism. Put another 
way, Tushnet greatly minimizes the costs of ending judicial review, es­
pecially for those who have nowhere else to turn but to the courts for 
protection. He greatly exaggerates the benefits of eliminating judicial 
review by imagining a populist approach to the Constitution that he 
never develops or explains. 
In Part I, I describe Tushnet's argument in some detail. Professor 
Tushnet's argument for ending judicial review is carefully developed 
and nuanced. Critiquing it first requires a detailed description. 
In Part II, I respond to each step of Tushnet's argument. My focus 
is to identify the unsupported assumptions in his argument and to 
5. See p. 175; see also ROBERT H. Boru<, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: 
MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 117 (1996). 
6. Tushnet, for example, is objecting to decisions such as Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976) (invalidating campaign finance reform); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating affirmative action programs); and Alder v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 
2240 (1999) (protecting states from suit in state court). 
7. Professor Tushnet has produced an extremely large body of scholarship. Some of his 
most notable contributions include RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRmCAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988) and a two-volume biography of Thurgood Marshall. He also 
has written dozens and dozens of influential law review articles. 
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highlight the extent to which he generalizes from a few examples to 
reach broad conclusions about the lack of benefits and the harms of 
judicial review. 
In Part III, I suggest that ultimately it is not possible to prove that 
Tushnet is wrong and that the country would be worse off without ju­
dicial review. Nor is it possible for him to prove the contrary. The 
idea of "better off" or "worse off" would require a calculus for deter­
mining the social good that is surely impossible to devise. Also, there 
is no way of calculating, over the past and future of American history, 
whether judicial review has produced and will produce more on the 
good or on the bad side of this ledger. Tushnet and his critics would 
agree that there have been some good decisions and some bad deci­
sions, however good and bad are defined, and there is simply no way 
to know how to measure the good against the bad. There is also no 
way to know, or calculate, the harms and benefits that would result if 
judicial review was completely eliminated. 
In the end, each side can make its arguments for and against judi­
cial review, but neither side will ever be able to prove its case or per­
suade the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of intuition and faith as to 
whether the benefits of judicial review outweigh its costs. My intuition 
is completely different from Tushnet's and I greatly fear that Taking 
the Constitution Away from the Courts, and other scholarship like it, 
will have an effect that will lead to less active judicial review, resulting 
in real long-term harms for society and severe barriers for those who 
most desperately need protection from the courts. 
I. TUSHNET'S ARGUMENT 
Tushnet's book lays out a well-developed argument in support of 
his conclusion that the Constitution should be taken away from the 
courts. There is an obvious danger in trying to summarize in a few 
pages a nuanced position developed over 200 pages, therefore, cri­
tiquing Tushnet's thesis requires setting it forth as carefully and neu­
trally as possible. 
I see five major steps to Tushnet's argument: 
1. There are two versions of the United States Constitution -
termed the "thick" Constitution and the "thin" Constitution. 
Tushnet introduces the distinction between the "thick" and "thin" 
Constitutions early in his book, and relies on it throughout (pp. 9-14). 
Indeed, Tushnet at the outset says: "Developing the argument against 
judicial supremacy and for a populist constitutional law requires me to 
introduce a distinction that will pervade this book - between the 
thick Constitution and the thin Constitution" (p. 9). 
The thick Constitution seems to be the detailed provisions that 
particularly concern the structure of government. Tushnet writes, 
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"[t]he thick Constitution contains a lot of detailed provisions describ­
ing how the government is to be organized" (p. 9). He identifies four 
characteristics of the provisions that constitute the thick Constitution: 
1) as a whole they are important in constituting the government; 2) 
they are rarely the subject of judicial attention; 3) they often are inter­
preted by the Supreme Court in an undesirable manner; and 4) the 
public is generally indifferent to them.8 
In contrast, the thin Constitution contains the provisions that 
Tushnet regards as important. He writes: "We can think of the thin 
Constitution as its fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of ex­
pression, and liberty" (p. 11). Professor Tushnet says that the thin 
Constitution is the collection of those ideals expressed in the Declara­
tion of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution (pp. 12-
13). He argues that "the thin Constitution is indeed admirable in ways 
the thick Constitution is not. The thin Constitution protects rights 
that it has taken centuries of struggle for people to appreciate as truly 
fundamental" (p. 12). 
2. Judicial review to enforce the thick Constitution is unnecessary 
and undesirable. 
The distinction between the thick and the thin Constitution is use­
ful for Tushnet because it allows him to dismiss the need for judicial 
review of much of the Constitution and then focus his argument on 
whether judicial review of the thin Constitution is desirable. 
This specific attention to the thin Constitution is possible because 
Tushnet argues that the provisions of the Constitution concerning the 
structure of government, such as federalism and separation of powers, 
are most likely to be followed because incentives for compliance exist.9 
He says, moreover, that courts often may err in interpreting these pro­
visions, concluding that "[t]he constitutional values protected by those 
features of our Constitution would not be threatened by eliminating 
judicial review, particularly when we recognize that the courts might 
themselves mistakenly bar our representatives from adopting policies 
that are in fact consistent with the Constitution" (p. 123). 
3. Even as to the thin Constitution, judicial review often is unneces­
sary in providing protections that would not exist without it. 
Tushnet quotes extensively from James Madison that the structure 
of the Constitution itself is a significant protector of rights and preven­
ter of tyranny (pp. 96-99). Tushnet also argues, at some length, that 
political pressures ensure that the government will not engage in sig-
8. Pp. 9-11. It should be noted that Professor Tushnet describes each of these charac­
teristics in a brief paragraph. 
9. Pp. 95-128. Tushnet especially develops this argument in Chapter Five. 
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nificant violations of rights and disregard for the Constitution.10 The 
core of the argument here is that the system is replete with incentives 
that encourage the government to act in a manner compatible with the 
Constitution. 
Tushnet thus concludes his chapter on "Assessing Judicial Re­
view": 
Looking at judicial review over the course of U.S. history, \ve see the 
courts regularly being more or less in line with what the dominant na­
tional political coalition wants. Sometimes the courts deviate a bit, occa­
sionally leading to better political outcomes and occasionally leading to 
worse ones. Adapting a metaphor from electrical engineering, we can 
say that judicial review basically amounts to noise around zero: It offers 
essentially random changes, sometimes good and sometimes bad, to what 
the political system produces. On balance, judicial review may have 
some effect in offsetting legislators' inattention to constitutional values. 
The effect is not obviously good, which makes us lucky that it is probably 
small anyway. [p. 153] 
4. Judicial review inevitably results in significant errors by the 
courts. 
Tushnet constantly emphasizes the errors made by the Supreme 
Court in interpreting the Constitution. In describing the thick 
Constitution, Professor Tushnet writes: "Judicial errors. The courts 
have not done an obviously admirable job when they have dealt with 
these provisions" (p. 10). As to the thin Constitution, he responds to 
those who defend judicial review by stating: "The conventional as­
sumption is that of course we get a higher rate of compliance with con­
stitutional values if the courts enforce the Constitution. That assump­
tion often rests on the unstated, and largely indefensible, belief that 
the courts never make mistakes. But they do" (p. 126). 
Tushnet indicates many of the decisions that he regards as mis­
takes, such as those invalidating affirmative action programs (p. 120), 
protecting corporate speech (pp. 130-31), and invalidating campaign 
finance reforms (p. 129). These, of course, are decisions frequently at­
tacked by progressives and have produced a large body of critical 
scholarship. Throughout the book, Tushnet makes it clear that his 
politics are liberal and that he regards many of the Rehnquist Court's 
decisions as mistakes. Indeed, my sense, as a reader, is that much of 
what animates this book is Tushnet's great frustration with the current 
and recent conservative Supreme Courts. 
10. Pp. 95-128. This argument is developed in detail by Professor Tushnet in Chapter 
Five. 
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5. Without judicial review, a populist constitutionalism will develop 
with benefits that outweigh any costs associated with the loss of judicial 
review. 
Having argued that the benefits of judicial review do not outweigh 
the costs of its mistakes, Tushnet then goes further and argues that the 
very institution of judicial review inherently contains undesirable ef­
fects. Most importantly, he repeatedly states that judicial review pre­
vents the development of a populist constitutionalism (pp. 171, 174, 
181-85). The book, however, does not offer a clear definition of 
"populist constitutional law." At only one point in the book does 
Tushnet offer an insight into the term's definition: 
What is populist constitutional law? Throughout this book I have de­
scribed it as a law oriented to realizing the principles of the Declaration 
oflndependence and the Constitution's Preamble. More specifically, it is 
a law committed to the principle of universal human rights justifiable by 
reason in the service of self-government. [p. 181] 
Tushnet intimates that without Supreme Court decisions regarding 
specific constitutional provisions, a popular rhetoric of constitutional 
law will develop (p. 194). He says that "[p]opulist constitutional law 
rests on the idea that we all ought to participate in creating constitu­
tional law through our action in politics" (p. 157). 
Moving from the populist notion to discuss lawmakers, Tushnet 
argues that legislators and executives will be more attentive to the 
Constitution if there is no judicial review to correct their violations. 
Without judicial review defining rights in constitutional terms, he con­
tends, a richer development of individual liberties will be possible. 
For example, Tushnet suggests that without judicial review, more 
statutory rights might be developed and that "[f]reed of concerns 
about judicial review, we might also be able to develop a more robust 
understanding of constitutional social welfare rights, which are recog­
nized in many constitutions around the world" (p. 169). 
Thus, Tushnet argues that the gains from judicial review are mini­
mal, while its costs in terms of mistakes and preventing a populist con­
stitutional law from developing are high. He, therefore. concludes 
that the Constitution should be taken away from the courts and the 
practice of constitutional judicial review should be abolished. 
II. A CRITIQUE OFTuSHNET'S .ARGUMENT 
I believe that Tushnet's conclusion rests on his systematic minimi­
zation of the benefits of judicial review and exaggeration of its costs, 
particularly by hypothesizing an idealized populist constitutional law 
that he never describes in any detail. In this Part, I discuss the as­
sumptions and gaps in Tushnet's argument. My goal here is not to 
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make the counter case in favor of judicial review; that would require a 
separate book. Rather, I seek to show why Tushnet has failed to es­
tablish his case for abolishing judicial review. 
A. The Distinction Between the Thick and the Thin Constitutions 
Tushnet's analysis begins with the distinction between the thick 
and the thin Constitutions, a comparison he invokes throughout the 
book. Yet, the distinction and its basis are never made clear. He indi­
cates only that the thick Constitution comprises the provisions that 
concern the structure of government, while the thin Constitution is 
composed of the provisions that safeguard basic human freedoms (pp. 
9-10). 
The problem with this argument, however, is that the constitu­
tional provisions concerning the structure of government frequently 
are defended on the grounds that they are key protectors of individual 
freedoms.11 In fact, Tushnet himself quotes James Madison at some 
length as supporting the view that the structure of government pro­
vides safeguards of liberties (pp. 96-99). If all of the Constitution 
serves to advance individual liberty in some way, then the distinction 
between the thick and the thin Constitutions seems unwarranted. 
Tushnet's answer is that the people of the United States are com­
mitted to the thin Constitution, not the thick one. His "argument is 
that we are constituted as a people by the thin Constitution, not the 
thick one" (p. 50). But he offers no support for this conclusion. In­
deed, observation suggests that people are just as committed to the 
concept of separation of powers and to the idea of having both na­
tional and state governments as they are to individual freedoms. 
Tushnet might respond that the concepts of separation of powers 
and federalism are part of the thin Constitution, but the detailed pro­
visions about them are part of the thick Constitution. The problem, 
though, is deciding what is ·the core and the thick Constitution, as op­
posed to the details and the thin Constitution. Consider a simple ex­
ample: Is the process of adopting a law, as outlined in Article I, Sec­
tion 7 of the Constitution, part of the thick Constitution or part of the 
thin Constitution? The idea that lawmaking requires action by both 
houses of Congress and signature by the President, or an override of a 
veto, seems basic to American government. I would suggest that 
popular commitment to this procedure is as great as the commitment 
to any provision of the Bill of Rights. Yet, if this is so, then Supreme 
Court decisions regarding the legislative veto and the line item veto 
11. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("State sovereignty is 
not just an end in itself: 'Rather federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from 
the diffusion of sovereign power.'") (citations omitted); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 511 
U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
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concern the thin Constitution.12 The distinction between the thick and 
the thin Constitutions becomes ever more ephemeral and difficult to 
draw. 
Tushnet also seems to refer to the thick Constitution as the large 
body of law developed by the Supreme Court interpreting the docu­
ment. Throughout the book, Tushnet is very critical of the various 
compl�x tests developed by the Court for particular constitutional 
provisions (pp. 111-12, 194). In other words, the thin Constitution is 
the statement of basic human rights, and all of the Supreme Court's 
interpretations are part of the thick Constitution. 
This distinction, also, is undefended and seems unhelpful. Tushnet 
uses this as a way of dismissing as relatively unimportant, if not actu­
ally undesirable, the Supreme Court's elaboration of constitutional 
rights. But constitutional tests such as "one person-one vote,"13 
heightened scrutiny for race and gender discrimination,14 and the re­
quirement for strict scrutiny of content-based restrictions of speech,15 
all advance Tushnet's thin Constitution. Because the Constitution is 
written in such broad, open-textured language, the body of case law 
that makes it thick in this sense is key to advancing the rights that 
Tushnet says that he cares about. 
B. Tushnet Greatly Minimizes the Benefits of Judicial Review 
As explained in Part I, a crucial aspect of Tushnet's argument is his 
claim that constitutional judicial review has minimal benefits. There 
are many reasons why Tushnet tremendously underestimates the 
benefits of judicial review. 
1. Tushnet focuses exclusively on the Supreme Court. 
Almost without exception, Tushnet's analysis of the benefits and 
costs of judicial review focuses entirely on Supreme Court decisions.16 
There is virtually no discussion in the entire book about the effects of 
judicial review by the lower federal courts and the state courts. Yet, 
12 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating the line item 
veto); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto). 
13. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1965) (articulating the standard of one­
person one-vote for elections). 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (requiring intermediate scru­
tiny and an extremely persuasive justification for gender classifications). 
15. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (articulating the requirement for strict 
scrutiny of content-based regulations of speech). 
16. The only real exception is his discussion of California's Proposition 187, which de­
nied government benefits to undocumented immigrants. The proposition was declared un­
constitutional by a federal district court and then settled at the appellate court level after the 
election of a Democratic governor who had opposed the initiative. See pp. 6-7, n.3. 
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the vast majority of constitutional litigation never reaches the SuM 
preme Court. Last term, the Supreme Court decided only seventyM 
three cases. Focusing exclusively on the high Court ignores the huge 
quantity of lower-court decisions enforcing the Constitution. All of 
the easy cases where lower courts strike down clearly unconstitutional 
government actions based on well-established law - cases that never 
would warrant Supreme Court review - are ignored by Tushnet's 
analysis. 
Tushnet possibly could make a couple of responses to this argu­
ment. He might suggest that lower court enforcement of the 
Constitution is no more likely to have benefits than Supreme Court 
decisionmaking; yet, the evidence in the book would not support such 
a conclusion. Tushnet argues that the Supreme Court generally is in 
accord with the popular will so its rulings make relatively little differM 
ence (pp. 134-35). He offers no such evidence, however, as to the 
lower courts. Nor does he account for the benefits of the instances 
where the courts are willing to overrule the popular will. 
Also, Tushnet could say that, qualitatively, the Supreme Court's 
decisions are far more important than those of the lower federal 
courts. In many ways, of course, this is true. For instance, the rhetoriM 
cal impact of the Supreme Court is so great because its pronounceM 
ments have national effects and receive national coverage that far ex­
ceed those of the lower courts. Moreover, errors by the Supreme 
Court obviously have greater impact because of their national scope 
and the lack of any realistic mechanism for correcting them (except for 
the Court later changing its mind). Yet, none of this speaks to the 
benefits of lower court enforcement and the thousands of lower court 
rulings that Tushnet, too, would regard as desirable. 
2. Tushnet overestimates voluntary compliance with the Constitution 
by the political branches of government. 
The classic, and I believe the most powerful, argument for judicial 
review is the need for it to enforce the limits of the Constitution. In 
Marbury, this is the primary argument advanced in favor of constituM 
tional judicial review.17 Chief Justice John Marshall declared: 
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be 
considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of 
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see 
only the law. 
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constiM 
tutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles 
and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, com­
pletely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what 
17. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 {1803) . 
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is expressly forbiden [sic], such act, notwithstanding the express prohibi­
tion, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practi­
cal and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to re­
strict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and 
declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure. 18 
Tushnet argues that the benefits of judicial review in enforcing the 
limits of the Constitution are minimal because there are incentives for 
the political branches to comply with the Constitution and existing 
political checks on the judiciary make it unlikely to depart far from the 
popular will (pp. 95-128). Even accepting Tushnet's argument en­
tirely, it ignores the instances in which the political process lacks the 
incentives he describes and in which the courts have acted to uphold 
the Constitution. 
Most dramatically, those without political power have nowhere to 
turn for protection except the judiciary. In a telling passage, Tushnet 
admits "[m]y wife is Director of the National Prison Project of the 
American Civil Liberties Union. She disagrees with almost everything 
I have written in this chapter."19 The reality is that the political proc­
ess has no incentive to be responsive to the constitutional rights of 
prisoners. Admittedly, the Rehnquist Court has a dismal record of 
protecting prisoners' rights,20 but overall, no one could deny that judi­
cial review has dramatically improved prison conditions for countless 
inmates who would be abandoned by the political process. 
Another example where political incentives fail is in situations 
where state and local governments choose to discriminate against out­
of-staters. Illustrations include right-to-travel cases involving the de­
nial of benefits to out-of-staters,21 Dormant Commerce Clause cases 
involving discrimination against out-of-state businesses,22 and deci­
sions under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV in­
volving discrimination against out-of-state citizens.23 In all of these 
situations, there is no incentive for a state or local government to be 
protective of out-of-staters who lack the ability to vote within the dis-
18. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178. 
19. P. 174. The title of this chapter is "Against Judicial Review." 
20. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (lintlting prisoners' access to law li­
braries); Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (lintlting procedural due process rights of 
prisoners). 
21. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (declaring unconstitutional a state law 
that limited welfare benefits for new residents to the amount of the state that they moved 
from for their first year of residence); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (declaring 
unconstitutional a state law that created a one-year residency requirement for eligibility for 
welfare benefits from the state). 
22. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating a state 
law that prohibited out-of-staters from burying garbage in New Jersey landfills). 
23. See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (declaring unconstitu­
tional a state law limiting admission to the state bar to residents of the state). 
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criminating state. Indeed, all of the political incentives favor the state 
or local government engaging in such discrimination. Similarly, the 
political process has no incentive to protect aliens from discrimination, 
but it has great incentive to impose burdens on aliens who cannot vote 
and thereby to benefit the citizens who do.24 
More generally, there is little incentive for the political process to 
protect unpopular minorities, such as racial or political minorities. 
How long would it have been before southern state legislatures de­
clared segregation of public facilities unconstitutional if not for Brown 
v. Board of Education?25 How long would it have taken Congress, 
dominated by Southerners in key committee chairs, to have acted in 
this regard? The point is that, overall, the political process has little 
incentive to protect those who have minimal likelihood of influencing 
the outcome of elections. 
Sometimes the political process will even fail the majority. Reap­
portionment is the classic example here. In the 1960s, malapportioned 
state legislatures were not about to reapportion themselves so as to 
decrease the political power of those in office. Every incentive led 
those who benefited from malapportionment to retain the existing sys­
tem. Only judicial review could institute one-person, one-vote.26 
These, of course, are just some of the examples where the political 
process cannot be relied on to comply voluntarily with the Constitu­
tion. In all of these areas, there are significant examples of judicial 
protections. These are benefits that Tushnet unduly minimizes. 
3. Tushnet underestimates the benefits of judicial review in securing 
state and local compliance with the Constitution. 
The nature of the federalist structure of American government is 
that there are fifty states and tens of thousands of local governments 
that can violate the Constitution. These include not only every town, 
city, and county, but every school board and zoning commission. 
Tushnet focuses especially on Congress and the President in discussing 
the incentives for voluntary compliance with the Constitution (pp. 
108-20). This focus ignores, however, the likelihood of constitutional 
infringements by all of the other levels of government and the corre­
sponding benefit of judicial review. 
A few examples illustrate this point. Without judicial review, the 
Bill of Rights would not be incorporated and applied to the states.27 
24. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 
(1971). 
25. 349 U.S. 294 (1954). 
26. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
27. Incorporation is discussed in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 372 (1997). 
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Although most states might voluntarily comply with most of the Bill of 
Rights, some states certainly would not follow every one of its provi­
sions. For instance, states did not provide free attorneys in felony 
cases until Gideon v. Wainwright.28 In this respect, Tushnet ignores 
the benefits of judicial review in securing state and local compliance 
with the Constitution. In fact, Tushnet's discussion of incentives at the 
federal level focuses solely on Madison's arguments about separation 
of powers and how conflicts among factions protect rights (pp. 96-99). 
Many local governments, however, do not have separation of powers, 
and often there is clear domination by one group without the protec­
tion of competing factions. 
Another illustration of how Tushnet minimizes the benefits of ju­
dicial review of state and local governments concerns abortion rights. 
Tushnet argues that without judicial review, political pressures would 
have resulted in legalizing abortion and that, in fact, the Supreme 
Court's rulings were undesirable in diminishing the incentives for po­
litical action to protect abortion rights (pp. 124-25, 138-39). Tushnet 
offers no evidence for this proposition. Even assuming political pro­
tection for abortion rights existed in most states, it certainly did not 
exist in every state. Numerous states today surely would have laws 
prohibiting abortion without judicial protection of the right. Consider 
the fact that as soon as the Supreme Court signaled that it might re­
consider the abortion issue, states and territories such as Idaho, Utah, 
and Guam immediately acted to restrict abortions. 
The point is that Tushnet ignores the benefits of judicial review of 
state and local governments that, for whatever reason and for what­
ever period of time, do not comply with the Constitution. In a feder­
alist system, especially one in which most states have judges who face 
electoral accountability, the assumption of voluntary compliance by all 
state and local governments is highly dubious. 
4. Tushnet uncritically accepts the scholarship of those who 
minimize the benefits of judicial review. 
Tushnet relies on scholars such as Gerald Rosenberg and Michael 
Klarman to support his argument that judicial review has minimal 
benefits (pp. 143-52). This scholarship, however, has been subject to 
enormous criticism, both as to its methodology and its conclusions.29 
Tushnet does not acknowledge these critiques, nor attempt to answer 
them. 
28. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
29. See, e.g., LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL 
CHANGE (David A. Schultz ed., 1998); David Schultz & Stephen Gottlieb, Legal Function­
alism and Social Change: A Reassessment of Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope: Can Courts 
Bring About Social Change?, 12 J.L. & POL. 63 (1996); Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 
CAL. L. REv. 1027 (1992). 
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Tushnet approvingly cites to Rosenberg's book, which in its subti­
tle asks: "Can courts bring about social change?" Several things 
about the question, which Tushnet implicitly accepts in minimizing the 
benefits of judicial review, need to be noted. First, it focuses solely on 
courts. The question could be phrased even more broadly to ask 
whether laws can bring about social change. For example, Tushnet 
laments that despite all of the court decisions concerning equal protec­
tion, economic conditions for African Americans are relatively un­
changed (p. 151). Over the past thirty-five years, major civil rights 
statutes have been adopted. The failure to improve economic circum­
stances for African Americans obviously reflects inadequacies not just 
of the courts, but also, and perhaps even more significantly, of legisla­
tures. 
The point is to ask whether it makes sense to evaluate the ability of 
courts to make a difference apart from the general ability of the law to 
make a difference. Scholars such as Rosenberg assert that it is better 
to direct efforts at social reform to legislatures rather than courts. 
These scholars assume, however, that legislatures would be successful 
where they perceive court failure. 
Second, the question assumes that it is possible to measure causa­
tion. Rosenberg, for example, asks if courts can "bring about" social 
change; Tushnet implicitly asks the same question throughout his 
book. Causation, obviously, is often enormously complex. Change is 
often a long-term process. The more profound the social change, the 
longer it is likely to take and the more variables that will likely be in­
volved. Great care needs to be taken in articulating how causation 
and change will be observed and measured. If changes are noted, can 
we evaluate whether they result from court decisions, from other legal 
changes, or from other social phenomena? 
Third, the question assumes that litigation and decisions are to be 
evaluated in terms of their resulting social change. At the very least, 
this requires deciding what social changes are relevant as a measure of 
success; but who is to decide what is relevant? Also, for many reasons, 
focusing on whether court decisions cause social change is an incom­
plete inquiry. Even if court decisions brought about no social change, 
they still might serve enormously important ends. Perhaps most im­
portantly, court decisions can provide redress to injured individuals. 
Even if laws forbidding employment discrimination are shown to have 
had little net impact in eradicating workplace inequalities, the statutes 
still serve a crucial purpose if they provide compensation to the vic­
tims of discrimination. Similarly, even if tort law does not succeed in 
deterring dangerous products and practices, it can be successful in 
compensating innocent victims. 
Moreover, redress might be noneconomic. Litigation can provide 
vindication to those who have suffered from unconstitutional or illegal 
practices. Brown was an enormously important statement of equality 
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even if little school desegregation resulted. Tushnet stresses the value 
of a populist rhetoric of judicial review (pp. 112-13, 187), but mini­
mizes the value of judicial rhetoric. Richard Kluger powerfully ex­
presses this vindication with regard to Brown: 
Every colored American knew that Brown did not mean that he 
would be invited to lunch with the Rotary the following week. It meant 
something more basic and more important. It meant that black rights 
had suddenly been redefined; black bodies had suddenly been reborn 
under a new law. Blacks' value as human beings had been changed 
overnight by the declaration of the nation's highest court. At a stroke, 
the Justices had severed the remaining cords of de facto slavery. The 
Negro could no longer be fastened with the status of official pariah. No 
longer could the white man look right through him as if he were, in the 
title words of Ralph Ellison's stunning 1952 novel, Invisible Man. No 
more would he be a grinning supplicant for the benefactions and discards 
of the master class; no more would he be a party to his own degradation. 
He was both thrilled that the signal for the demise of his caste status had 
come from on high and angry that it had taken so long and first exacted 
so steep a price in suffering.30 
Finally, and most importantly, court decisions upholding the 
Constitution can protect key values even if no social change can be 
linked to the rulings. For instance, court decisions safeguarding 
freedom of speech protect the rights of individuals to express 
themselves and lead to a better informed citizenry, even if no better 
policies can be linked to the decisions. Allowing the Pentagon Papers 
to be published did not bring about social change, but it was a crucial 
vindication for an important constitutional value.31 Stopping 
government aid to parochial schools does not change society, but it 
enforces the 
Establishment Clause and the traditional value of separation of church 
and state.32 
My point is that without even presenting the critiques of 
Rosenberg's work, it is possible to identify many benefits of judicial 
review that Tushnet minimizes or ignores. 
30. RICHARD !<LUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 749 (1975). 
31. See New York Times Co. v .  United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
32 See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 
(1971) (imposing lintlts on public aid to parochial schools). 
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5. Tushnet selectively chooses examples to minimize the 
benefits of judicial review and to ignore the benefits 
of the "overhang" of judicial review. 
Tushnet selects a few examples to show the minimal benefits of ju­
dicial review. For example, he describes the political safeguards of 
federalism that exist to protect state and local governments without 
federal judicial action (pp. 99-101). He also discusses the constitu­
tional provisions concerning impeachment and the President's duties 
to enforce the law (pp. 104-08, 113-18). 
This argument generalizes from only a few areas and reaches 
broad conclusions about the role of courts. It is a logical fallacy to say 
that because judicial review is unnecessary in some areas, it is gener­
ally unneeded. Likewise, it is a fallacy to say that because some deci­
sions have limited impact, most decisions have limited impact. 
Moreover, Tushnet ignores the benefits of judicial review in deter­
ring unconstitutional acts by legislative and executive officials at all 
levels of government. He speaks of the "overhang" of judicial review 
and tells how knowledge of its existence causes other government offi­
cials to have less need to follow the Constitution. This may be true, 
but the overhang also has a positive effect: it discourages government 
officials from taking actions that they know will be declared unconsti­
tutional by the courts. I have had countless experiences, formally in 
legislative hearings and informally in working with legislators and 
their staffs, where constitutional objections and the likelihood of in­
validation caused them to abandon a proposed course of action. 
This benefit of judicial review cannot be quantified. Never will it 
be possible to measure the laws that did not come into existence and 
what their impact would have been. But no one familiar with the leg­
islative process would deny the benefit of this "overhang" of judicial 
review. 
My description of how Tushnet minimizes the benefits of judicial 
review is not exhaustive. But it, at least, indicates a serious flaw in the 
argument for the elimination of constitutional judicial review. 
C. Tushnet Overestimates the Costs of Judicial Review 
Tushnet makes two basic arguments as to the costs of judicial re­
view: one emphasizes the costs of judicial errors; the other stresses 
how judicial review prevents a populist constitutional law and the 
benefits associated with it. As to the former, as indicated in Part I, 
Tushnet repeatedly discusses judicial mistakes in constitutional cases 
as a key cost of judicial review.33 
33. See supra Part I. 
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The problem is that Tushnet offers no definition of what is a judi­
cial error. As best I can tell, a judicial error is a decision that Tushnet 
does not like. No other criteria are suggested. This subjectivity makes 
the case for eliminating judicial review inherently unpersuasive be­
cause there is no way to balance the benefits against the costs of judi­
cial review without some criteria for measuring the good and the bad. 
Tushnet offers none. 
As to the latter argument-that judicial review prevents a populist 
constitutional law-Tushnet never develops or explains this argument, 
and that is one of the book's greatest frustrations. The idea of a 
"populist constitutional law" has great rhetorical appeal. But what 
exactly this means, and how eliminating judicial review will bring it 
about, are left unclear. 
Tushnet says that a populist constitutional law will advance the 
"principle of universal human rights justifiable by reason in the service 
of self-government" (p. 181). He says that "[p]opulist constitutional 
law rests on the idea that we all ought to participate in creating consti­
tutional law through our actions in politics" (p. 157). But what does 
this idea actually mean in practice? Who will be participating and 
what will they be doing? 
Also, Tushnet never clarifies why judicial review prevents a popu­
list constitutional law from developing. Tushnet implies that the com­
plex body of judicially created law prevents the populist constitutional 
law (p. 194). But the reality is that people often speak in terms of 
their basic rights (which is his focus in a populist constitutional law) 
even with judicial review and complicated court decisions. 
In fact, it is quite possible that without judicial review there would 
be less of a populist constitutional law. Without judicial review to en­
force the Constitution, and to reinforce it in the public's conscious­
ness, it is conceivable that the Constitution would become ever less 
important in society. The linkage between eliminating judicial review 
and developing a populist constitutional law is not explained or de­
fended. Nor does Professor Tushnet do more than simply assert that 
eliminating judicial review might cause more development of statutory 
rights and welfare rights (pp. 168-69). The fact that another country 
without judicial review has more welfare rights does not provide 
enough reason to believe that this country, without judicial review, 
would embrace such rights. 
Indeed, there is an implicit contradiction in Tushnet's analysis. He 
contends that the Supreme Court generally is in accord with the 
popular will, but he also contends that a populist constitutional law 
would advance human freedom. There is a tension here: Why believe 
that the populist constitutional law would be better in advancing past 
popular sentiments than judicial review? The contrary seems almost 
certainly the case. A populist constitutional law, almost by definition, 
would reflect popular attitudes. The judiciary, in contrast, at times can 
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be a moral leader and protect our core values - Tushnet's thin Con­
stitution - from hostile public pressure. 
As a simple example, popular attitudes in many parts of the coun­
try strongly support school prayer and religious infusion of govern­
ment actions. The courts have been far more willing to resist this 
pressure and enforce the Establishment Clause than any conceivable 
populist constitutional law. The Texas town that wanted student 
prayers at high school football games surely never would have em­
braced a popular constitutional law prohibiting them.34 
D. Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts? 
Tushnet argues for taking the Constitution away from the courts, 
but it never becomes clear what this means. Tushnet, apparently, 
would create a bright-line rule that all constitutional challenges are 
dismissed by courts. In other words, the government always would 
prevail against a constitutional claim. Tushnet's approach would thus 
be the functional equivalent of the state action doctrine in suits against 
private parties. The state action doctrine means that subject to very 
narrow exceptions, there is no cause of action against private viola­
tions of the Constitution.35 Tushnet's rule would mean that there 
would be no cause of action or constitutional claim of any sort against 
the government. 
What would this mean in criminal cases? Would courts simply ig­
nore the Constitution in evaluating whether to issue a warrant or to 
provide a jury trial or in determining what evidence to admit? Much 
of the Bill of Rights is concerned with criminal procedure. These 
cases cannot be taken out of the courts without a radical change in 
American government. Is Tushnet suggesting that the courts should 
do whatever the government (i.e., the prosecutors) want in criminal 
cases? The undesirability of this is obvious and enormous. Similarly, 
in criminal prosecutions it appears that Tushnet's approach would 
force courts to apply criminal statutes even when they are patently un­
constitutional. 
Simply put, it makes no sense to take the Constitution out of the 
courts for cases that already are in the courts. For instance, in United 
States v. Nixon,36 there was a criminal prosecution by the Watergate 
Special Prosecutor and an attempt to enforce a subpoena for evidence 
for the forthcoming trials. President Nixon invoked executive privi­
lege as a defense to the subpoena. Even though this issue involves 
34. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000) (invalidating student­
delivered prayers at football games). 
35. For a discussion of the state action doctrine, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 
385-414. 
36. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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Tushnet's "thick" Constitution because it concerns separation of pow­
ers, it is unclear how the Court could have avoided the constitutional 
issue; either it would have ruled for or against the President. 
More importantly, Tushnet does not advocate taking the Constitu­
tion completely away from the courts. Toward the end of the book, 
Tushnet says that courts still could invalidate legislative acts by devel­
oping other doctrines, such as by finding government actions are "ul­
tra vires" and beyond the legislature's powers (pp. 163-65). 
This approach allows Professor Tushnet to keep judicial review but 
just give it a different label. What, for example, would make a gov­
ernment action ultra vires? Obviously, if the government action ex­
ceeds the powers of the government under the Constitution, it is then 
ultra vires. Constitutional judicial review still would exist, but would 
be called something different. Tushnet's examples of how ultra vires 
is used in countries without judicial re"View undermine his argument 
that judicial review is unnecessary. It shows that even countries with­
out written constitutions and without judicial review want courts to be 
a check on executive and legislative actions. This, in itself, is powerful 
evidence against taking the Constitution away from the courts. 
III. CAN JUDICIAL REVIEW BE ASSESSED? 
In reading Tushnet's book, I realized that there was no way for 
him to prove that the benefits of judicial review are outweighed by its 
costs, but no way for a critic to prove the converse either. First, there 
would have to be a way of measuring what would be considered good 
and bad effects of Supreme Court decisions. The idea of decisions 
making society "better off" or "worse off" would require a calculus for 
determining the social good that is surely impossible to devise. Even if 
somehow it could be defined, the causation problems would be im­
mense; often it would be highly disputed as to what benefits or harms 
result from the courts' decisions. 
Second, even assuming that good and bad could be defined, there 
would need to be a way of adding up the effects of all of the good de­
cisions and the effects of all of the bad decisions to compare them. 
This task, however, would be impossible because, to a large extent, the 
impacts are qualitative. How could enforcing separation of powers, or 
enhancing human dignity, or preventing cruel and unusual punish­
ment, or any other effects, be quantified, let alone added together? 
Third, there would need to be a way of assessing events that did 
not occur. How many unconstitutional laws were not adopted, with 
what harms, because government officials knew that they were likely 
to be declared unconstitutional? Conversely, how many unconstitu­
tional laws were enacted because, according to Tushnet's argument, 
government officials knew that there was judicial review as a back­
stop? There is obviously no way to answer these questions. Even 
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more unknowable are the future effects, positive and negative, of 
eliminating judicial review. 
These are just some of the problems with Tushnet proving his case, 
as he has set it out, for eliminating judicial review. The same problems 
would exist in trying to prove the opposite: that the benefits of judi­
cial review have outweighed its costs. 
Indeed, the types of criticisms that Tushnet offers of judicial review 
could be made of any institutional structure. A critic of democracy 
might argue for a benevolent dictator by making the same claims as 
Tushnet. The critic could point to all of the mistakes American de­
mocracy has made and even the horrible laws that have been enacted. 
The advocate of dictatorship could identify all of the incentives that 
exist for a dictator to remain benevolent and all of the good things that 
a dictator might do that are precluded in a democracy. A few coun­
tries where dictatorship has worked could be invoked, just as Tushnet 
occasionally mentions Great Britain and the Netherlands as illustra­
tions of countries without judicial review that have not experienced 
significant harms (p. 163). The argument would be that most of the 
benefits of democracy would be gained anyway, that there are exam­
ples of serious errors by democracy, and that a benevolent dictatorship 
could produce numerous benefits. 
This argument could not be proven true or false by adding up all of 
the benefits of democracy and comparing them to all of the harms. 
Certainly, historical experience with dictatorships in other countries 
might be considered. But more importantly, process arguments would 
be made as to why democracy is preferable to dictatorship. The same 
seems a much preferable way of analyzing judicial review rather than 
speaking of its errors and trying to compare it to its benefits. 
Over a decade ago, as the conclusion to a book about judicial re­
view, I wrote: 
Yet I have no way of proving [that the long-term benefits of judicial 
review outweigh its costs]. It is difficult to know how to add up the bene­
fits of all past "good" decisions and weigh them against the costs of all 
past "bad" decisions. Therefore, I suggest that the best way to determine 
the proper method of constitutional decision making is not to add up the 
examples but rather to structure an inquiry about government that will 
focus discussion on the purposes of the Constitution and the best way to 
accomplish them. The focus should be on basic normative questions: 
Should society be governed by a constitution? Should the Constitution 
evolve or remain static? Should evolution be by interpretation or by 
amendment only? Who should be the authoritative interpreter of the 
Constitution? and What limits should exist in the interpretive process?37 
In the end, it is a matter of faith. I continue to have faith that, in 
the long term, society is better off with a judiciary to enforce the limits 
37. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 141 (1987). 
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contained in the Constitution, to give concrete meaning to its broad 
provisions, and to apply it to contemporary problems. It is frightening 
to me that respected scholars like Professor Tushnet have lost this 
faith. I worry that the erosion of faith in judicial review may cause 
courts to be less willing to enforce the Constitution and that serious 
harms could result - especially for those who have nowhere else to 
tum for protection except to the courts. As I read Taking the 
Constitution Away from the Courts, I kept wondering whether he 
really could be serious in calling for the end to all constitutional judi­
cial review. 
CONCLUSION 
Sometimes I begin a federal courts class or a constitutional law 
class by having my students read the United States Constitution and a 
copy of the Stalin-era Soviet constitution. My students always are 
surprised to see that the latter has a far more detailed and elaborate 
statement of individual rights. I also have them read a description of 
the enormous human rights violations that occurred in the Stalin-era. 
The point, of course, is that words on paper are not enough to 
make a constitution meaningful. The difference between America and 
the former Soviet Union, in part, was that no court in the Soviet 
Union could have invalidated the government's actions. Judicial re­
view is crucial to enforcing the Constitution and making the Constitu­
tion more than just words on parchment in the National Archives. It 
is hard for me to believe that anyone could seriously want to take the 
Constitution away from the courts. 
